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THE SUPPRESSION OF EMPLOYER FREE SPEECH A NEW BAN ON "CONSCIOUS OVERSTATEMENTS"
AND A CAVEAT AGAINST "BRINKMANSHIP"
HARRY

L.

BROWNEt AND HOWARD

I.

F. SACHStt

INTRODUCTION

ON JUNE 16, 1969, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.' The Gissel
opinion decided four cases, all of which presented as the primary legal
issue, the authority of the National Labor Relations Board to impose
bargaining orders on employers whose unfair labor practices rendered
a fair election unlikely. In deciding this issue, the Court gave sweeping approval to the Board's use of union authorization cards in lieu
of an election allowing employees an opportunity to select or reject
the union by secret ballot. A secondary issue involved in one of the
cases decided by Gissel was whether statements made to his employees
by a Massachusetts employer, David H. Sinclair, constituted such an
election-voiding unfair labor practice as to fall outside the protection
of the first amendment and section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act.' While it was the primary issue (the Board's utilization of
"card checks" to prove union majority) that provoked considerable
controversy in the law of labor relations,' it is the secondary issue,
t Member of the Indiana and Missouri Bars. B.S., Indiana University, 1934;
J.D., 1936.
tt Member of the Missouri Bar. A.B., Williams College, 1947; J.D., Harvard
University, 1950.
1. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
2. The views of the Court on this issue appear in the final section of the Gissel
Packing Co. opinion and contain the Court's rationale for affirming the limitation on
free speech in a decision handed down by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968). For convenience, reference will
be made in this article to the Sinclair litigation, since the issue involves the right of
expression of David H. Sinclair, President of The Sinclair Company of Holyoke,
Massachusetts.
3. See NLRB v. Sandy's Stores, Inc., 398 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1968) ; NLRB v.
Dan Howard Mfg. Co., 390 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing
Co., 386 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967) ; Crawford Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 386 F.2d 367 (4th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968) ; NLRB v. Swan Super Cleaners, Inc.,
384 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1967) ; NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1967) ;
NLRB v. S.E. Nichols Co., 380 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1967); Engineers & Fabricators,
Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Bauer Welding & Metal Fabricators,
Inc. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1966); Bok, The Regulation of Campaign
Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78
HARV. L. Rrv. 38 (1964) ; Browne, Obligation to Bargain on Basis of Card Majority,
3 GA. L. Rlv. 334 (1969) ; Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an
NLRB Election, 65 Micr. L. R~v. 851 (1967) ; Lewis, The Use and Abuse of
Authorization Cards in Determining Union Majority, 16 LAB. L.J. 434 (1965) ; Perl,
The NLRB and Bargaining Orders: Does a New Era Begin With Gissel?, 15 VILL.
L. Rvv. 106 (1969) ; Sheinkman, Recognition of Unions Through Authorization Cards,
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the Sinclair or "free speech" portion of Gissel, that is considered here,
for its importance in the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act
cannot be overemphasized.
In a premature obituary on "the Warren Court," published in
December, 1968, a distinguished commentator described the theme of
recent Supreme Court decisions on freedom of speech in the Court's
own words: "uninhibited, robust, and wide open." 4 The only notable
decision in the Warren era that Professor Kalven considered a "perplexing" and "sudden move in the opposite direction" was the rule
against pandering, established as an element in obscenity cases by a
5 to 4 vote.5 If Professor Kalven had waited until Chief Justice
Warren's final days of service the tone of his article might have been
decidedly different, for in Sinclair, speaking for a unanimous Court,
the Chief Justice ruled that "employers as a class" have a peculiarly
restricted freedom to talk. Like the panderer, in fact, employers have
now been officially cautioned by the Supreme Court to avoid "brinkmanship" in their communications to employees.'
The Sinclair part of Gissel reversed the results of an employee
election in which 13 employees had voted 7 to 6 against designating
Teamsters Local 404 as their collective bargaining representative. The
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit sustained the order of the Board
requiring the employer to bargain with the Union without another
election, based on authorization cards previously signed by the employees. The Supreme Court, in its decision, conceded that, while
Mr. Sinclair was not initially bound to bargain on the basis of cards,
his pre-election communications to employees had contained improper
3 GA. L. Rv. 319 (1969) ; Welles, The Obligation to Bargain on the Basis of a
Card Majority, 3 GA. L. &~v. 349 (1969) ; Comment, Union Authorization Cards:
A Reliable Basis for an NLRB Order to Bargain, 47 TZXAs L. Rgv. 87 (1968);
Comment, Refusal-to-Recognize Charges Under Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA:
Card Checks and Employee Free Choice, 33 U. Cni. L. REv. 387 (1966).
However, neither Sinclair nor any of the certified issues in Gissel involved
the question of what constitutes sufficient misrepresentation or coercion to vitiate the

use of authorization cards to establish a union's majority status. The Supreme Court
refused to grant certiorari with respect to solicitor misrepresentations in the previous
term. Bryant Chucking Grinder Co. v. NLRB, 392 U.S. 908 (1968) ; Preston Products
v. NLRB, 392 U.S. 906 (1968); NLRB v. Crawford Mfg. Co., 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
Nor was the validity of the Board's "sole and only" purpose rule, that unambiguous
union authorization cards would be accepted unconditionally as evidence of union
majority unless the solicitor made the precise representation that the "sole and only"
purpose of the card was to secure an election (Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B.
1268, enforced 351 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1965)), before the Court.
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court's approval of the Board's authority
to issue bargaining orders on the basis of authorization cards was so broad that it
also encompassed acceptance, albeit limited, of the Board's Cumberland Shoe rule.
The matter was not an issue, and this aspect of the case deserved fuller treatment than
the Court accorded.
4. Kalven, "Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide Open" - A Note on Free Speech
and the Warren Court, 67 MicH. L. R v. 289 (1968).
5. Ginzberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
6. 395 U.S. at 620.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/2
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verbal and pictorial material which affected the results of the election,
and, on this basis, an order to bargain without a further election was
a proper remedy. The Court rejected the argument that the ruling
impinged upon the employer's free speech.
As pertinent history it is important to note that the Sinclair
Company, a Massachusetts producer of mill rolls, wire, and related
products, had bargained with a union other than the Teamsters from
1933 to 1952, when it experienced a three-month strike which resulted
in a reopening without a union contract. The employees had thus
remained unrepresented until the present litigation. In September,
1965, the Teamsters Local presented authorization cards signed by a
majority of the employees, and requested that the Company bargain
with it. Mr. Sinclair declined, asserting good faith doubt of majority
status because of the inherent unreliability of such cards. On November 8, 1965, the Union petitioned for an election, which was ultimately
held on December 8, 1965, and which the Union lost by a vote of
7 to 6. The Company's vigorous campaign against selection of the
Union, as detailed in the Supreme Court opinion, contained the
following elements:
When petitioner's president first learned of the Union's drive
in July, he talked with all of his employees in an effort to dissuade
them from joining a union. He particularly emphasized the results of the long 1952 strike, which he claimed 'almost put our
company out of business,' and expressed worry that the employees
were forgetting the 'lessons of the past.' He emphasized secondly
that the Company was still on 'thin ice' financially, that the
Union's 'only weapon is to strike,' and that a strike 'could lead
to closing the plant,' since the parent company had ample manufacturing facilities elsewhere. He noted thirdly that because of
their age and the limited usefulness of their skills outside their
craft, the employees might not be able to find re-employment if
they lost their jobs as a result of a strike. Finally, he warned
those who did not believe that the plant could go out of business
to 'look around Holyoke and see a lot of them out of business.'
The president sent letters to the same effect to the employees in
early November, emphasizing that the parent company had no
reason to stay in Massachusetts if profits went down.
During the two or three weeks immediately prior to the
election on December 9, the president sent the employees a pamphlet captioned 'Do you want another 13-week strike?' stating,
inter alia, that 'We have no doubt that the Teamsters Union can
again close the Wire Weaving Department and the entire plant
by a strike. We have no hopes that the Teamsters Union bosses
will not call a strike ....

The Teamsters Union is a strike happy

outfit.' Similar communications followed in late November, in-
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cluding one stressing the Teamsters' 'hoodlum control.' Two days
before the election, the Company sent out another pamphlet that
was entitled 'Let's Look at the Record,' and that purported to
be an obituary of companies in the Holyoke-Springfield, Massachusetts, area that had allegedly gone out of business because of
union demands, eliminating some 3,500 jobs; the first page carried
a large cartoon showing the preparation of a grave for the Sinclair
Company and other headstones containing the names of other
plants allegedly victimized by the unions. Finally, on the day
before the election, the president made another personal appeal to
his employees to reject the Union. He repeated that the Company's financial condition was precarious; that a possible strike
would jeopardize the continued operation of the plant; and that
age and lack of education would make re-employment difficult.'
The Supreme Court upheld the Board's finding that such communication was "interference, restraint, and coercion" and was not
protected by the first amendment and section 8(c) of the Act. As
described in the opinion of Chief Justice Warren, section 8(c) of
the Taft-Hartley Act :'
merely implements the First Amendment by requiring that the
expression of 'any views, argument or opinion' (by an employer)
shall not be 'evidence of an unfair labor practice,' so long as such
expression contains 'no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit' in violation of section 8(a)(1). Section 8(a)(1), in
turn, prohibits interference, restraint or coercion of employees in
the exercise of their right to self-organization.'
It is submitted that prior to this decision, the employer's hard-hitting
campaign would have been judicially considered well within the bounds
of protected "campaign oratory," under principles earlier established
by the Supreme Court and by Congress, and under the growing court
protection accorded for "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" discussion of controversial issues. Before examining the degree of constraint
imposed by the recent decision, it is appropriate to review summarily
the developing concept of first amendment protection for the expression
of viewpoints in labor disputes, as it bears on the subject of employer free speech.
II.

EMPLOYER

FREE SPEECH IN

THE

1940's

Under the Wagner Act of 1935, the National Labor Relations
Board sternly suppressed employer discussion in union election cam7. Id. at 587-89.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964).
9. 395 U.S. at 617.
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paigns. The policy of the Board, born of conditions in the depth of
the depression, was based on two theories: (1) an employer was
deemed to be without proper standing to intervene in decision-making
by his employees, and (2) it was presumed that employer views would
unduly influence employee choice. As the crisis of the depression
began to lift, it was recognized that there were very strong countervailing theories: (1) employers have a considerable economic stake in
employee decisions on collective bargaining and often have a considerable emotional stake in the selection between a patriarchal system
of business operations and collective bargaining; and (2) employees
are not likely to be unduly influenced by persuasion from employers
(or a union organizing group) when they have the protection of private
choice by secret ballot. These policy arguments for and against employer free speech were overshadowed in the 1940's by the discovery
that there were also overriding constitutional considerations.
Having announced in Thornhill v. Alabama,10 that employees
have first amendment freedoms which cannot be suppressed by government, the Supreme Court then declared in NLRB v. Virginia Elec.
& Power Co.," that employers likewise have a constitutionally guaranteed right to speak. The Court there reversed and remanded for
reconsideration the Board's finding that an employer had committed
unfair labor practices by interfering with employee choice and coercing
employees to join an independent union. The Board's decision was
based on evidence of verbal persuasion, combined with threats and
coercive acts (including discharge of employees affiliated with a rival

C.I.O. union). The Court reversed the Board, having concluded that
the Board had found that certain "utterances were unfair labor practices, and it does not appear that the Board raised them to the stature
of coercion by reliance on the surrounding circumstances. If the utterances are thus to be separated from their background, we find it
difficult to sustain a finding of coercion with respect to them alone."' 2
Presented with argument that the first amendment protects employer
speech, Justice Murphy adopted the libertarian contention and announced: "The employer in this case is as free now as ever to take
any side it may choose on this controversial issue.""
In 1945, free speech in the labor context was given further constitutional protection in Thomas v. Collins, 4 when five members of the
Court struck down a Texas statute requiring registration of union
organizers before soliciting memberships. In a concurring opinion,
10. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
11. 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
12. Id. at 479.
13. Id. at 477.

14. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
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however, Justice Jackson needled his colleagues with a charge of
favoritism, asserting that "we are applying to Thomas a rule the
benefit of which in all its breadth and vigor this Court denies to employers in National Labor Relations Board cases."'" For support,
Justice Jackson cited Virginia Electric, where the result on remand
was adverse to the employer; and saw evidence of unequal treatment
in the denial of certiorari in three subsequent cases. The majority,
however, sought to assure Justice Jackson that they were ready to
apply first amendment rights equally to employers and to union
organizers. Justice Douglas observed that any use of economic coercion passes beyond "the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment. This is true whether he be an employer or an employee.
But as long as he does no more than speak, he has the same unfettered
right, no matter what side of an issue he espouses."'" Further, Justice
Rutledge, speaking for the Court, acknowledged that:
[E]mployers' attempts to persuade to action with respect to
joining or not joining unions are within the First Amendment's
guaranty. .

.

. The Constitution protects no less the employees'

converse right. Of course espousal of the cause of labor is entitled
to no higher constitutional protection than the espousal 7 of any
other lawful cause. It is entitled to the same protection.'
Significant to the new Sinclair decision are two points made by
Justices Rutledge and Jackson in Thomas. The Rutledge opinion
stated that attempts to persuade are constitutionally protected, and
that freedom of speech involves more than the right "merely to describe facts."'8 Justice Jackson declared that "the same nature of
problem" occurs in the selection of a bargaining representative and
selection of governmental officials, and concluded that "if free speech
anywhere serves a useful social purpose, to be jealously guarded, I
should think it would be" in a representation election." 9 Thus, when
the Wagner Act was overhauled by Congress in 1947 by enactment
of the Taft-Hartley Act, and the right to refrain from collective bargaining was given express recognition, 20 an express guarantee of employer free speech was incorporated by section 8(c) into the new law. 2'
Congress supposedly made it clear by this section that:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual
15. Id. at 548.
16. Id. at 543-44.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 537-38.
Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
Id. at 546.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).

21. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/2
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form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice
under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.22
This, as Chief Justice Warren observed in Sinclair, "implement[ed]
the First Amendment.

III.

2' 8

ELECTIONS IN

A

LABORATORY

Within a year of this legislation, the Labor Board, by a divided
vote, but relying on its statutory duty to conduct elections and certify
the results, 24 devised a new method for broadly regulating employer
speech in representation elections. Recognizing that speech which does
not threaten reprisals or promise benefits could not be used as an unfair labor practice under the wording of the controlling statute, the
Board found that other types of speech nevertheless could be used as
a ground for setting aside representation elections. In General Shoe
Corp.,2 5 the majority of the Board, responding to an anti-union argument appealing to religious prejudice, set aside an election, declaring:
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a
laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under
conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited
desires of the employees. It is our duty to establish those conditions; it is also our duty to determine whether they have been
fulfilled. When, in the rare extreme case ... the requisite laboratory conditions are not present . . . the experiment must be con-

ducted over again."
22. The purpose of the amendment was made clear by the committee reports on
the proposed bills:
This guarantees free speech to employers, to employees, and to unions.
Although the Labor Board says it does not limit free speech, its decisions show
that it uses against people what the Constitution says they can say freely ....
The bill corrects this, providing that nothing that anyone says shall constitute or
be evidence of an unfair labor practice unless it, by its own express terms,
threatens force or economic reprisal.
H.R. Rip. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1947). The Senate Committee report
provided:
Another amendment to this section would insure both to employers and to
labor organizations full freedom to express their views to employees on labor
matters, [as long as] they refrain from threats of violence, intimation of economic
reprisal, or offers of benefit. The Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, (323 U.S.

516) held, contrary to some earlier decisions of the Labor Board, that the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech on either side in labor controversies and
approved the doctrine of American Tube Bending case (134 F.2d 993). The Board
had placed a limited construction upon these decisions. . . . The Committee
believes these decisions to be too restrictive. ...
S. Rsp. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1947).
23. 395 U.S. at 617.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1964).
25. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
26. Id. at 127.
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A sharp contrast between the Board imposed "laboratory conditions" and the free speech protection otherwise given to "low blows"
in public controversy was pointed up within a year of the General
Shoe decision when a majority of the Supreme Court, in Terminiello
v. Chicago,27 reversed a conviction of an anti-semitic rabble-rouser.
Dissenting on other grounds, Justice Jackson conceded forthrightly
that it is "the legal right of any American citizen" to give expression
to sentiments invoking prejudice, "whether pro-semitic or anti-semitic,
pro-negro or anti-negro, pro-Catholic or anti-Catholic. 2'1 While the
Supreme Court has never ruled on the inhibition to this "legal right"
which the Board created when it prescribed "laboratory conditions,' '29
members of the academic community have expressed grave doubt that
the Board's restrictions on inflammatory speech are constitutional, or
can be soundly policed. 80
Having proclaimed the necessity of maintaining "laboratory conditions" as a prerequisite for a valid representation election, a result
which too often precludes the salutary "finality" to an election campaign, the Board has also discovered that the rule may be judicially
enlarged and applied in a manner contrary to the Board's view. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, for example, upset an election
(upheld by the Board) when the union won by making an "irrelevant"
and "inflammatory" appeal to the "racial pride or prejudice" of the
Negro employees. 8 ' Further, many judges have evidenced a similar
willingness to go beyond Board standards in setting aside representation
elections when false or misleading statements occur in the campaign.
The Board's consideration of misleading assertions of fact is undertaken to determine whether the charges qualify for the following test:
We believe that an election should be set aside only where there
has been a misrepresentation or other similar campaign trickery,
which involves a substantial departure from the truth, at a time
which prevents the other party or parties from making an effective
reply, so that the misrepresentation, whether deliberate or not, may
reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the election. 2
27. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
28. Id. at 32.
29. It has recognized the Board's "wide discretion to ensure [a] fair and free

choice" (NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Company, 394 U.S. 759, 767 (1969)) and has
recited Board practice impinging on free speech (Linn v. Plant Guard Local 114, 383
U.S. 53 (1966)) but has not squarely faced the constitutional issues.
30. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HAzv. L. Riv. 38, 67-74 (1964) ; Pollitt, The
National Labor Relations Board and Race Hate Propagandain Union Organization
Drives, 17 STAN. L. Riuv. 373 (1965).
31. NLRB v. Schapiro & Whitehouse, Inc., 356 F.2d 675, 678-79 (4th Cir. 1966).
32. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 224 (1962).
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One of the circumstances found to prevent an "effective reply" is the
degree of knowledge credited to the source of the misrepresentation,
whether it was "a party that had special knowledge of, or was in an
authoritative position to know, the true facts.""3
Recent cases show a tendency of the courts to upset union victories
because of last-minute misrepresentations, which were deemed harmless by the Board. 4 Such action by the courts is apparently thought
necessary to hold the Board to standards of review as rigorous as
those it applies to misrepresentations by employers. 5 These courts
are apparently influenced by the fact that when representation elections
are held, the Board often imposes rigid "laboratory conditions" on
employers to insure freedom of choice, yet the conditions under which
union authorization cards are signed are often disregarded, and the
cards are casually accepted as proof of union majority. 6
Finally, it should be noted that as in the case of inflammatory
speech, commentators have generally questioned Board and court
actions setting aside representation elections upon findings of misleading assertions of fact, believing that such inhibitions on expression
endanger first amendment freedoms and have no demonstrable relationship with sound testing of employee sentiment. 7 It is frequently
urged that adequate opportunity for rebuttal eliminates the need for
restrictive rules presently imposed on the substantive content of an
employer's speech."8
33. Celanese Corp. of America, 121 N.L.R.B. 303, 307 (1958). A collection of
decisions on this subject appears in Effect of Alleged Misstatements or Misrepresentations in Campaign Literature, Material, or Leaflets on Validity of Representation
Election, Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 889 (1965).
34. See, e.g., National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.
1969), wherein Judge Carswell found three operative misrepresentations by a union
where the Board found none, and set aside an election for distribution of the challenged
leaflet on the day of the election.
35. NLRB v. Trancoa Chem. Corp., 303 F.2d 456, 460-61 n.5 (1st Cir. 1962).
36. NLRB v. Southland Paint Co., 394 F.2d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 1968), wherein
the court stated:
No wonder the Act, in terms (section 9(c)), provides for the selection of a union
as bargaining representative by regulated secret ballot. In keeping with the importance of the election, the Board takes great care to prevent management or
labor from coercing the employees. Indeed, the Board has prided itself on its
providing "laboratory conditions" in regulating elections, so as "to determine the
uninhibited desires of the employees."
After reviewing other "card-check" cases, the court went on to say at 725:
"Laboratory conditions" are conspicuous by their absence in many cases involving
selection of a bargaining representative by the use of authorization cards.
This "sharp contrast" was also noted by the Second Circuit in NLRB v. River Togs,
Inc., 382 F.2d 198 n.10 (2d Cir. 1967).
37. Bok, supra note 30, at 82-92; Christensen, Free Speech, Propagandaand the
National Labor Relations Act, 38 N.Y.U.L. Riv. 243 (1963).
38. See, e.g., Bok, supra note 30, at 91-92, 103.
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IV.

COERCIVE SPEECH DISTINGUISHED

Until the Supreme Court spoke in the current Sinclair litigation,
it was believed that a clear distinction appeared between the "fair
campaign" rules which the Board and the courts were struggling to
formulate under the Board's supervisory control of representation
elections and the narrowly-stated type of unfair labor practice described
as "coercive speech." When Congress acted in 1947 to define and
limit the type of speech which could be deemed an unfair labor practice outside the scope of first amendment freedoms, it established
narrow rules for the determination of proscribed activities such as the
vote-buying type of speech, promising benefits to employees for a vote
against an undesired union; or the intimidating speech, threatening
force or other form of reprisal for a vote in favor of the undesired
union. The plain language of the 1947 statute stated that expressions
of "views, argument or opinion" could not be used as evidence of an
unfair labor practice, so long as the expression contains "no threat of
reprisal or force or promise of benefit."'8 9 While these limitations on
"campaign oratory" might, on occasion, be difficult to apply, the test
itself is not difficult to understand. The Act was intended to protect
all speech which did not offer a bribe or did not threaten the employees
with retaliation if they disobeyed the employer's wishes. As we shall
see, factual problems which may arise under this test often center on
whether a typical campaign argument, predicting that a union victory
will throw the parties into a sea of troubles, is properly construed as a
threat of malicious backlash by a loser unwilling to abide by the results.
There are several practical differences between the dual limitations on free speech under the "laboratory" test created by the Board
and applied in representation elections, and the "coercive speech" test
created by statute and applied in unfair labor practice proceedings.
An employer found guilty of using "coercive speech" is subject to
sanctions. In Sinclair, for example, the employer who initially was
entitled to have its employees vote to accept or reject a union by secret
ballot was required to deal with a union which had not proved its
status other than by obtaining a majority of signatures in public
solicitation. Further, an employer found guilty of "coercive speech"
may discover that he has begun to compile a Labor Board record of
misconduct which may affect judgment in future controversies. Moreover, an unfair labor practice conviction by the Board will authorize
a cease and desist order, expressly restraining future speech, thus imposing a "gag rule" on the employer. Such an affirmative restriction
on speech would not attach to the setting aside of an election for in39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964).
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flammatory or misleading speech deemed inconsistent with the sterile
conditions required by the laboratory test. Finally, the employer found
guilty of an unfair labor practice is subject to court restraint and
possible contempt action should he continue with "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open" speech.
V.

FREE SPEECH IN LABOR DISPUTES
REAFFIRMED IN

Linn

In 1966, the Supreme Court had occasion to review the scope of
protected free speech in labor organization campaigns in the first
significant decision on the subject in more than twenty years. In Linn
v. Plant Guard Local 114,0 the Court divided 5 to 4 in sustaining a
complaint for damages, alleging defamation of a company manager
by a union during the course of an organizational campaign. The
narrow issue in Linn was whether federal labor legislation precluded
common law actions for defamation related to labor disputes. The
majority of the Court, while sustaining such suits where there are
"defamatory statements published with knowledge of their falsity or
with reckless disregard of whether they were true or false . . .")41
recognized that free discussion was more clearly protected in the labor
field than elsewhere. The majority observed that "representation campaigns are frequently characterized by bitter and extreme charges,
countercharges, unfounded rumors, vituperations, personal accusations,
misrepresentations and distortions. Both labor and management often
speak bluntly and recklessly, embellishing their respective positions
with imprecatory language." 4 2 Further, the majority opinion interpreted NLRB policy as generally permitting "wide latitude" for free
expression in organizing campaigns, including toleration of "intemperate, abusive and inaccurate statements," and generally leaving to
" 'the good sense of the voters' " and the initiative of the opposing
parties the correction of " 'inaccurate and untruthful statements.' 4
On the other hand, the Court referred, without approval or disapproval, to the practice of the Board in setting aside elections "where
a material fact has been misrepresented in the representation campaign; opportunity for reply has been lacking; and the misrepresentation has had an impact on the free choice of the employees. ...
Reference was also made to the protection given by the Board to
erroneous and defamatory statements uttered without "actual malice,
40. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
41. Id. at 65.

42. Id. at 58.
43. Id. at 60-61.
44. Id.University
at 60. Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
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'a deliberate intention to falsify' or a 'malevolent desire to injure.' ,,45
The conclusion of the majority was that private actions for defamation were not contrary to the purposes of national labor policy, so
long as high standards for recovery were maintained, analogous to
the high standards imposed in seeking recovery for defamation of a
46
public figure.
Finally it is important to note that four members of the Court
in Linn would have granted absolute immunity for free speech in
labor disputes. Justice Black asserted absolute constitutional protection against damage suits for libel ;47 in the labor law context, he found
no congressional purpose "to try to purify the language of labor disputes," in which "both sides are masters of the arts of vilification,
invective and exaggeration." 4 Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Douglas joined in a dissenting opinion by Justice Fortas, which
agreed with all members of the Court that "hyperbole" is "characteristic of labor-management strife,"4 concluding that libel suits for
malicious and reckless defamations were inconsistent with the intent
of Congress that the "labor-management dialogue" should have a
privileged status "untrammelled by fear of retribution for strong
utterances."' o
VI.

NOVELTIES

OF Sinclair

Returning to analysis of the Sinclair litigation, it seems demonstrable that the applicable rules governing employer speech have been
greatly altered by that case. The distinction between the "laboratory"
test and the "coercive speech" test has almost vanished, by judicial
fiat, and the "laboratory" test has apparently been tightened. Unless
the Sinclair ruling is modified by the Court or limited in practice,
first amendment rights in labor disputes will be widely disregarded,
in exchange for a system under which there will be "minute dissection of each word and claim made in an election campaign in a
nervous effort to prevent a voter from being wrong." 1
A.

Finding of "Coercive Speech"

It was the opinion of the Supreme Court in Sinclair that the
employer's vigorous campaign, as previously described, conveyed the
following message:
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 61.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
383 U.S. at 69.
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 73.
Christensen, supra note 37, at 278.
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that the company was in precarious financial condition; that the
"strike-happy" union would in all likelihood have to obtain its
potentially unreasonable demands by striking, the probable result
of which would be a plant shut-down, as the past history of labor
relations in the area indicated; and that the employees would
have great difficulty in finding employment elsewhere."
The Court then ruled that the Board "could reasonably conclude that
the intended and understood import of that message was . . . to

threaten to throw employees out of work regardless of the economic
realities."5 " Two grounds were relied upon by the Court to support
its conclusion that the speech was coercive and an unfair labor practice:
(1) that petitioner had no support for his basic assumption that
the union, which had not yet even presented any demands, would
have to strike to be heard, and that he admitted at the hearing
that he had no basis for attributing other plant closings in the area
to unionism; and (2) that the Board has often found that employees, who are particularly sensitive to rumors of plant closings,
take such hints as coercive threats rather than honest forecasts. 4
To further buttress its position, the Court relied upon an article by
Dean Bok which contains a section analyzing recent cases dealing
with free speech in the labor field. 5 It appears, however, that the
Court erred in its interpretation of this commentator's views. For
example, the article in question contains repeated references to Board
decisions finding "coercive speech" where the writer doubted the
result. On the page cited by the Court, Dean Bok referred to threats
of a retaliatory shutdown as "a devastating and improper assertion,"
but he pointed out that "it is also important to avoid discovering
veiled threats or sinister ambiguities by placing a strained interpretation on the employer's remarks." 56 Further, in a comment which
comes close to anticipating the Sinclair case, the author stated:
When the employer declares that he will have to move or close
down if a union comes in and obtains higher wages, union organizers can reply that their negotiators will take account of the company's position and endeavor not to induce its departure from the
area. Under these circumstances, the arguments on both sides are
legitimate, and the voters are free to choose between them.57
52. 395 U.S. at 619.

53. Id.
54. Id. at 619-20.
55. Bok, supra note 30, at 74-82.
56. Id. at 77.
57. Id.
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59
Further, neither Kolmar Laboratories" nor Surprenant,
cases analyzed in the Bok article, go as far as Sinclair toward suppressing
normal economic debate. In the review of the Kolmar campaign by
the Court of Appeals, a threat to close the company's Milwaukee
plant was inferred when the company repeatedly asserted there was
no economic incentive in remaining in Milwaukee, and that Milwaukee
operations were based on sentimental motives. The Court was thus
able to conclude that the message to employees was simply that "election
of the union would be tantamount to the termination of operations
at Milwaukee."" ° In Surprenant, the employer made a coercive assertion that election of the union would cause it to withdraw all employee
benefits, and added that if a strike occurred, the company might decide
to move the operation elsewhere or to shut it down. 6 The Court of
Appeals, while holding the coercive assertion improper, was careful
to distinguish this from the type of an argument which would be
proper, to wit:

(Gordon) referred to other plants in the Clinton area that had
been unionized and subsequently moved out of town because they
could not profitably operate due to excessive union demands.
We are of the opinion that if Gordon's remarks on this phase
of the question had been limited to a prediction of the economic
problems if the union came in, they would not have constituted
6 2
coercive statements.
The comment in the cited case thus supports the Sinclair campaign,
which was based on economic arguments and statements of fears of
the employer, and did not reasonably suggest an automatic retaliatory
shutdown upon selection of the union or a strike by the union.
A meaningful rationale behind the Supreme Court's contrary determination, namely that the Board could conclude that Mr. Sinclair had
threatened "to throw employees out of work regardless of the economic
realities," is difficult to fathom. The Court surmised that employees
may erroneously construe rumors of plant closings as coercive threats;
however, there is no authority for upsetting an election because of
possible unfounded suspicions of some imaginative voters. More important to the Court's reasoning, apparently, was its conclusion that
David Sinclair had offered "no support" for his stated fear of excessive
union demands which would result in a strike; and more significantly
58. Kolmar Laboratories, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 805, enforced 387 F.2d 833 (7th
Cir. 1967).
59. Surprenant Mfg. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 507, enforced 341 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1965).
60. NLRB v. Kolmar Laboratories, Inc., 387 F.2d 833, 836-37 (7th Cir. 1967).
61. Surprenant Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 756, 761 (6th Cir. 1965).
62. Id.
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that "he admitted at the hearing that he had no basis for attributing
other plant closings in the area to unionism."" The Court then proceeded to condemn "conscious overstatements" by employers in preelection campaigns.
The conclusion is almost inescapable that the Court found an
unfair labor practice because David Sinclair uttered what the Court
regarded as a "misleading statement" as to the cause of other plant
closings, rather than for a true threat of retaliation. If so, the case
has grossly broadened the reach of "coercive speech." Moreover,
without attempting to vouch for Sinclair's motives, it appears the
Court itself overstated the record when it concluded that Sinclair
had "admitted" that he had no basis for connecting unionism with
the closing of other plants in the area. Assuming, arguendo, the
necessity of establishing a factual connecting link before engaging in
a prediction or expressing a viewpoint (a restriction that would undoubtedly hobble persons in all walks of life), only a careless reading
of the record could have missed the evidence that Sinclair, in fact,
had "an objective basis" for the views he expressed in the election
campaign, despite what the Court regarded as his "admissions.""
Mr. Sinclair testified:
I say some of these companies were already sick and they had
problems. The companies needed higher production and better
quality to meet stiff competition that they were facing and that
the union did not do anything to help them in this regard.
They had restrictions, restricted production and caused higher
labor costs and the result of all this was the companies went
out of business ....65
There being no other testimony regarding the economic factors leading
to the plant closings, it can hardly be fairly asserted that Mr. Sinclair
"admitted" misstatements to his employees or advanced any contentions exceeding normal campaign hyperbole, familiar to every voter
and to voter-employees. While the record regarding the economic
causes of other plant closings might have been more fully developed
by both sides, the employer had no reason to believe before the hearing
that he would be charged with "intentional misrepresentation" 66 as
the equivalent of threats of retaliation or coercion.
In general, it would be the impression of an experienced practitioner in labor relations that employers whose small plants are unorganized and are located in areas of the country suffering from
63. 395 U.S. at 619.
64. App., Writ of Certiorari, at 25-26, 40-41, 61-63, Sinclair Co. v. NLRB, 395

U.S. 575 (1969).
65. Id. at 80.
66. Id. at 54.
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economic blight, may have genuine fears of the economic effects of
unionization; and an expression of such fears during an organizing
campaign generally represents a sincere point of view or opinion. It
may also convey to employees a legitimate prediction affecting their
own job security. One wonders how many of the Board members
and judges who sat in the Sinclair case are truly confident of the
future of the plant in Holyoke, Massachusetts.
B.

More Rigid Requirements for the "Laboratory"

Assuming there was some overstatement in connecting unionization with the troubles of five other companies in the area, the Sinclair
result, setting aside the election because of such exaggeration of factual
conditions, represents a tightening of requirements for the "sterile
laboratory," which would be controversial even apart from the startling
finding of "coercive speech." The testimony of the employer shows
that he claimed knowledge of a connection between unionization and
plant closings in two or possibly three of the plants which closed,
and had a generalized opinion that all the plant closings were related
to the existence of unions in the plants. If a technical reader of the
testimony were to discredit the generalized claim, and to accept only
the cases where Sinclair stated without contradiction that he had
information linking the closings to unionization, a post-election critic
might urge that Sinclair should have named two or three plants
rather than all five. The Court's opinion would seem to put an unnecessary premium on precise accuracy, not at all consistent with
normal persuasion techniques employed by the participants in an
election campaign. Furthermore, as Dean Bok points out in a parallel
case, corrected campaign literature would probably have an impact
"every bit as strong as the assertion that was actually made" and
there would seem to be little justification for "devoting months of
litigation to an attempt to fault the employer." 6 7
The opinion of Chief Justice Warren also ignores the qualifications which the Board itself had devised for determining when an
election should be set aside, after finding a substantial misrepresentation. In Hollywood Ceramics, and in many other cases, the Board
and the courts have stated that an election will only be set aside
when the misrepresentation occurs "at a time which prevents the
other party . . . from making an effective reply.""8

Such a rule en-

courages full debate, a salutary consideration which should not have
been so lightly disregarded. A further factor not applied by the
67. Bok, supra note 30, at 82.
68. 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 224 (1962).
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Supreme Court was whether Sinclair was "a party that had special
knowledge of, or was in an authoritative position to know, the true
facts" about the causes for closing of other plants. This test, adopted
by the Board in Celanese Corp.6 9 and other cases, recognizes that
"puffing" is frequently involved in persuasion. Whether these factors
are still useful tests is an open question, now that they have been
summarily ignored by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's rationale restricts open debate. If unionization had no relationship to the closing of the five plants, the union
could have argued this with as much authority as Sinclair argued
the contrary. Sinclair referred to the other plant closings in Holyoke
some four months before the election, giving the union full opportunity
for preparing and delivering a rebuttal.7" Indeed, as the Chief Justice
noted in his opinion, Mr. Sinclair gave a speech in July, 1965, warning employees "who did not believe that the plant could go out of
business to 'look around Holyoke and see a lot of them out of business.'"71 It is true that this brief but pungent comment did not
provide the more detailed warning against the ultimate effect of
unionization that appeared in the pamphlet which was sent out two
days before the election. If the July statement could be deemed inadequate notice of the issue, and the pamphlet could be considered
seriously misleading, the timing of the pamphlet might have justified
setting aside the election under the right-of-rebuttal principle; but
the Court's failure to rest its decision on the last-minute aspect of
the distribution of the pamphlet creates a danger of widening censorship of campaign materials, whenever distributed, and of undermining
the efficacy of debate on critical issues.
C.

The "Code Word" Method for Finding
Coercive Threats

The Chief Justice stated that the Board could reasonably conclude
that Sinclair had "threatened" in the event of unionization "to throw
employees out of work regardless of the economic realities."72 The
Board made no such unqualified finding, nor could it do such on the
record in the case. The conclusion of the Trial Examiner, adopted
by the Board, was that the Sinclair campaign, "considered as a whole,
69. 121 N.L.R.B. 303, 307 (1958).
70. "The remedy [under the principles of the free debate] is for the union to
answer them, not a cease and desist order." NLRB v. TRW Semiconductors, Inc.,
385 F.2d 753, 760 (9th Cir. 1967). Or, put another way, "it is up to the participants
in a campaign to find and counteract any statements that they deem inaccurate or misleading." NLRB v. Hobart Brothers Co., 374 F.2d 203, 206-07 (6th Cir. 1967).
71. 395 U.S. at 588.
72. 395 U.S. at 619.
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reasonably tended to convey to the employees the belief or impression that selection of the Union in the forthcoming election could lead
Respondent to close its plant, or to the transfer of the weaving production, with the resultant loss of jobs to the wire weavers. ''7 The
Trial Examiner qualified this ambiguous finding still further by saying that a strike by the union rather than the selection of the union
"could lead to the closing of the plant. 7' 4 He concluded, in effect,
that requisite "laboratory conditions" for an election were missing;
that the employer's campaign "generated an atmosphere of fear of
economic loss which completely polluted the free atmosphere which is
'75
indispensable to a valid election."

The Trial Examiner and the Board were in error for they failed
to center attention on the decisive statutory test for an unfair labor
76
practice, whether the employer had threatened retaliation or reprisal.
The Supreme Court went even further. The Court's ruling that a
trier could conclude that Sinclair had threatened to discharge the
employees "regardless of the economic realities" adopts a theory of
malicious intent which goes beyond any finding by the Board or by
the court of appeals, which premised its decision on the assumption
that the employer had a "sincere" belief "that unionization will or
may result in the closing of the plant."'77 The record contains no
supportable basis for the Supreme Court's suggestion of malicious
intent. On the contrary, a letter from Mr. Sinclair to the employees
gave them an express pledge that the Company would be governed
by economic factors, and assured them that "[w]e would not close
the plant in retaliation for employees voting for a Union."7 " Not a
word in the campaign, directly or indirectly, indicated an intention
to close the plant without economic cause, in retaliation against selection of the union. Any inference of such an intent would necessarily
rest on the sophisticated and inexact "code word" theory of campaigning, where words lose their ordinary meaning and the character
of the campaigner leads one to believe he intends one thing when he
73. App., supra note 64, at 183.
74. Id. at 184.

75. Id. at 189.
76. In an almost identical case, NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.

1967), the Board found employer speech was likely to create and instill in the minds
of the employees fear .of economic loss or suffering. There, as here, the focus was not
on the language used in the communication but on the "belief" which might be created.
Judge Friendly rejected this approach:

This is reading the Act as if Sec. 8(c) did not exist; while there is a risk
that an employer's prediction of adverse consequences from unionization may be
taken as a threat to produce them, to hold that this danger alone suffices to convert
a prediction into a threat of reprisal would go back to the very position of the
early 1940's which Sec. 8(c) was adopted to change.

Id. at 928.
77. NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157, 160 (1st Cir. 1968).
78. App., supra note 64, at 132.
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says something else. 79 It is submitted that this reliance on the "code
word" theory will render future policing of elections virtually impossible and not susceptible to consistent application.
In the Board's brief in Sinclair, the Board quoted Professor
Archibald Cox to the effect that words have an impact which should
be judged according to "environment and experience. . . . The dictionary meaning is irrelevant; the question is, what did the speaker
intend and the listener understand. 80 Chief Justice Warren adopted
the final portion of the Cox quotation, trimming from it the suggestion that dictionaries are no longer useful to the understanding of
words. If the Court thought the Cox statement extreme, it nevertheless applied the "code word" concept in deciding the Sinclair case,
without any indication in the record that "environment and experience" demonstrated that a threat of retaliation could be fairly read
into the statements of Mr. Sinclair.
It is remarkable that the Supreme Court allowed itself to place
a malicious interpretation on the Sinclair words when the Trial
Examiner had somewhat avoided finding an actual threat of retaliation, since the "code word" concept, if usable at all, is designed for
use by the trier of fact, not appellate judges. Professor Cox advocated
its use by "the trial examiners who absorb the atmosphere by visiting
the community and observing the parties and witnesses" to the end
that the trial of labor cases might receive "the kind of intuitive reaction which influences a jury. . . ." He found such fact-finding useful
because "words which may only antagonize a hard-bitten truck driver
in Detroit may seriously intimidate a rural textile hand in a company
village where the mill owners dominate every aspect of life."'" However, the Supreme Court, instead of remanding the case for further
consideration of the "threat of retaliation" contention, impatiently
found a threat from its apparently hasty review of the printed record.
Professor Cox traced to Judge Learned Hand his contention that
an employer's words should be searched for a malignant meaning
without regard for their dictionary definition, quoting the statement
79. A classic example of the "code word" analysis occurs in the "law and order"
issue from the 1968 Presidential campaign. Students of campaigning have concluded
that the words "law and order" were used by some politicians in 1968 as "code words
for repression of the blacks." Former Governor Wallace was thus accused of using
"law and order" with a racist meaning, based on various aspects of his career. It has
been pointed out, however, that all the Presidential candidates except Senator
McCarthy used "law and order" themes, to some degree, and have seldom been accused
of appealing to racism, since their careers do not readily lend themselves to such an
interpretation. It would appear that the "code word" argument is erratic and unfair,
particularly in a judicial context, unless there is solid evidence undermining the credibility of the speaker, permitting one to conclude that the face value of words spoken
cannot be trusted. L. CH.STXR, AN AMZRICAN MELODRAMA 384 (1969).
80. A. Cox, LAW AND TvHNAvIONAL LABOR POLiCY 44 (1960) (emphasis added).
81. Id.
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that "what to an outsider will be no more than vigorous presentation
of a conviction, to an employee may be the manifestation of a determination which it is not safe to thwart." 2 Judge Hand was dealing
with a case where a direct threat to an employee known to be a union
supporter was discernible in the employer's statement. A threat of
discharge or some form of personal retaliation is not unknown in
such a context. In Sinclair, however, the Court permitted language
to be construed as a threat of suicidal retaliation, the closing of a
plant simply to harm the employees. Experienced labor relations
attorneys rarely, if ever, find such a Samson in a lifetime of practice.
When the Supreme Court or the hypothetical timid employee would
seriously anticipate a malicious plant closing unwarranted by economic
causes, the conclusion suggests suspicion run riot.
Ironic contrast with the extraordinary display of suspicion of
employer motives in Sinclair is provided by another first amendment
case decided in 1969, 3 where the Court freed a defendant charged
with threatening the life of the President, holding his words should
be given a harmless construction. At a rally at the Washington
Monument, the defendant stated that he had been called "for my
physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make
me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J."
The Court summarily ordered an acquittal because, "taken in context,
and regarding the expressly conditional nature of the statement and
the reaction of the listeners (who laughed), we do not see how it
could be interpreted except as " 'a kind of very crude offensive method
of stating a political opposition to the President.' " The Court said
it was necessary for the Government to prove a "true 'threat.' We
do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner fits within that statutory term." 4 Yet only two months after
brushing aside this talk of assassination, the Court gave a malicious
effect to the language in Sinclair which the Court of Appeals was willing to treat as a sincere statement of the employer's fear of unionization.
D.

Rejection of the Political Election Analogy
The Sinclair decision classifies employer free speech in representation elections as sui generis, and rejects analogies to political elections.
The Court declared that:
[w]hat is basically at stake is the establishment of a nonpermanent, limited relationship between the employer, his economically
dependent employee and his union agent, not the election of legis82. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
83. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
84. Id. at 708.
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lators or the enactment of legislation whereby that relationship is
ultimately defined and where the independent voter may be freer
to listen more objectively and employers as a class freer to talk .5
The Court's statement that employer free speech is more limited than
that of the ordinary citizen, and indicating that it is more limited
than the rights of employees to discuss unionization, departs from
6 that
Justice Murphy's statement for the Court in Virginia Electric"
employers are "as free" as they were before the enactment of the
Wagner Act "to take any side (they) may choose on this controversial
issue (of unionization)." It also departs from the opinion in Thomas
v. Collins"7 stating that employer free speech and employee free speech
are given "the same protection." Finally, it clearly rejects the view
of Justice Jackson that the "nature of the problem" is the same in
representation and political elections, and is to be as "jealously guarded"
in representation elections as in other contexts.
Dean Bok, whose exhaustive study of problems in representation elections was cited by the Court with approval, endorsed the
Jackson view that "representation elections are closely akin to political contests,""8 and the close analogy has similarly impressed other
scholarly commentators.8 9 The "Warren Court" itself drew a close
analogy between representation elections and the debate of public
issues when it ruled in the Linn case, in 1966, that defamation standards applicable to claims by public figures should be "adopted by
analogy" in defamation cases arising in a context of labor disputes.9 °
In the last term of Court, shortly before deciding Sinclair, the Court
said, "the language of the political arena, like the language used in
labor disputes . . .is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact."'"

In

Sinclair, however, it rejected the analogy which it had previously
expressed and instead placed unique restraints on the employer's
freedom to speak in union election cases.
E.

Inhibiting Effect of Warning Against
"Brinkmanship"

One of the contributions of the "Warren Court" in its many
decisions protecting freedom of expression (outside the labor field)
was the development of the theory that any restriction having a "chill85. 395 U.S. at 617-18.
86. NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941).
87. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
88. Bok, supra note 30, at 68.
89. Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARV. L. RiV.
1191, 1206 (1965).
90. Lim v. Plant Guards Local 114, 383 U.S.53, 65 (1966).
91. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
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ing effect" on full expression must be struck down. Professor Kalven
concluded, from opinions prior to the 1968-69 term, that "[a] regulation of communication may run afoul of the Constitution not because
it is aimed directly at free speech, but because in operation it may
trigger a set of behavioral consequences which amount in effect to
people censoring themselves in order to avoid trouble with the law. '"92
In Sinclair, writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Warren
turned the table on Professor Kalven, and welcomed the idea of
employer self-censorship.
At the outset of its consideration of the free speech claim in
Sinclair, the Court noted that "employers must be careful in waging
their anti-union campaign. '93 While agreeing with the long-established principle that an employer is "free to communicate to his
employees any of his general views about unionism or any of his specific
views about a particular union [and] may even make a prediction as
to the precise effects he believes unionization will have on his company," Chief Justice Warren cautioned that "the prediction must be
carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer's belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his
control. . . -94 Responding to argument that there was no adequate
guide for an employer to follow, no clear distinction between free
speech and "proscribed threats," the Court declared that an employer
"can easily make his views known without engaging in 'brinkmanship' when it becomes all too easy to 'overstep and tumble.' . . . At
the least he can avoid coercive speech simply by avoiding conscious
overstatements he has reason to believe will mislead his employees.""
The language of the Court cuts deeply into the normal areas of
free speech. Ignoring the statutory protection given to the expression
of employer "views, argument or opinion," the Court declared that
predictions of dire economic consequences of unionization must be
based on "objective fact" and upon "demonstrably probable consequences," as where " 'the eventuality of closing [of a plant] is capable
of proof'"." The Court has gone a long way toward holding that
union organizers have a constitutionally protected right to use all
their powers of persuasion, but an employer must repress his fears
and his theories and must merely "describe facts." 97 Not only must
employers distinguish between facts and opinions in making predictions; the facts relied on must be true, and the burden of proof is
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Kalven, supra note 4, at 297.
395 U.S. at 616.
Id. at 618.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 618-19.
But see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).
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apparently cast on the speaker. Hobbled by these restrictions, employer warnings about the consequences of unionization become so
hazardous that cautious advisers may direct their clients to easier
areas of argument, and the full debate so essential to intelligent choice
will be effectively suppressed.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Former Chief Justice Warren bestowed upon the law of labor
relations an unhappy last-minute legacy in the Sinclair portion of
the Gissel decision which may drastically reduce the effective scope
of employer free speech. The clear-cut legislative directive of twenty
years' standing which was designed to protect expressions of opinion
while prohibiting threats of reprisal has been grossly distorted to
classify predictions as threats when found to contain "conscious overstatements." The Supreme Court has apparently created a new unfair
labor practice, contrary to the expressed intent of Congress.
Even if Sinclair had merely set aside a representation election,
after a finding of misrepresentations in the campaign, the result would
have notably accelerated the widely criticized trend toward censorship
of labor campaign materials. The courts and the Labor Board are not
only importing into labor campaigns technical legalistic restrictions
unsuited for lay campaigners, but are thereby showing lack of confidence in the normal democratic process and are underestimating the
intelligence of the voters to come to a correct decision.
Prior to Sinclair, it had been thought that the libertarian thrust
of the Warren Court, building on the decisions of the Forties, would
favor uninhibited labor campaign oratory, from whatever source, using
whatever theme might appeal to the speaker. In Sinclair there was a
rude awakening, as the most advanced libertarians on the Court
acquiesced in a repressive decision when the speaker was an employer
using arguments they did not admire.
A generous appraisal of Sinclair is that it was the work of a
tired Court, at the end of the term, influenced by an emotional misunderstanding of the record below, and by the unarticulated theory
that the employer's argument contained an eve-of--election misrepresentation on a vital issue. Logic would require a new election, on
such a premise; yet the Court ordered the employer to bargain with
the defeated union, and enforced a cease and desist order against
further repetition of the argument. It is unfortunate that the free
speech issue in Sinclair was considered by the Court in an authorization card case, where the remedy of a bargaining order seemed
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relatively free of constitutional implications. If it had been considered
without being so obscured, the stark inhibiting effect of the cease and
desist order would have riveted the Court's attention on the first
amendment issue and a more considered and defensible decision would
have undoubtedly resulted.
In order that the law not be wholly warped by the decision,
Sinclair can only be viewed as a judicial accident, based on a finding
of a "threat" which was never made. Only by limiting Sinclair to
its own misunderstood "facts" can employer free speech be restored
to its proper constitutional status.
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